Certain media coverage of specific terrorist acts sometimes carries no less dangerous potential than the terrorists themselves. In this regard, the interests of ensuring public safety are in line with the productive interaction of the media with the authorities, including law enforcement agencies.
From a speech at the international scientific-practical conference “International terrorism: the origins and counteraction.” St. Petersburg, April 18, 2001
— The failed explosion in Ryazan makes the public think that the FSB is behind the explosions. For the “party of war” this is an extra indication that the big war in Chechnya should be started immediately. It is no coincidence that it was on September 24, as if the explosion in Ryazan took place, a harsh speech by Putin and all power ministers was scheduled.
September 24, as in a well-planned performance, Russian politicians begin to unanimously demand war. Patrushev reports that the terrorists who carried out the bombing of apartment buildings in Moscow are currently in Chechnya. We know this is a lie. Patrushev does not indicate the sources of information, since there are none. Patrushev does not give evidence. His spokesman Zdanovich spoke only about the possible or probable departure of terrorists to Chechnya (or to the CIS countries). But Patrushev needs to start a war, and he claims that Chechnya has become a hotbed of terrorism.
The Vek newspaper publishes an interview with the vice president of the board of military experts Alexander Vladimirov, who believes that the best way out now is a small victorious war in Chechnya. In his opinion, the sanitary cordon around Chechnya proposed by Putin is good, but this should only be the first step, since a cordon for the sake of the cordon is meaningless. (Of course, Vladimirov’s point of view was taken into account and started right away with the second step – a full-scale war.)
The last decisive vote for the war was cast by Prime Minister Putin in Astana: “The Russian state does not intend to release the situation on the brakes. (…)
The recent unprovoked attacks on the territories adjacent to Chechnya, the barbaric actions that led to civilian casualties, put terrorists not only outside the law, but also outside the framework of human society and modern civilization. ” Airstrikes are carried out “exclusively on the bases of the militants, and this will continue wherever the terrorists are.” (…) We will pursue terrorists everywhere. If, sorry, we’ll catch in the toilet, then we’ll soak them in the toilet. ”
The mood in society in those days was best characterized by the fact that after the catch phrase “in the toilet we’ll kill you,” Putin’s rating increased. The propaganda campaign of the war supporters achieved the desired result.
According to a public opinion poll conducted by the All-Russian Central Institute of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), almost half of Russians were convinced that Basayev’s militants carried out the explosions in Russian cities, another third blamed Wahhabis led by Khattab. 88% of respondents were afraid of becoming a victim of a terrorist attack. 64% agreed that all Chechens should be deported from the country. The same percentage favored the massive bombing of Chechnya.
House bombings have turned public opinion. The small victorious war seemed the natural and only way to fight terrorism. The fact that the terrorists are not Chechens, and the war will not be small and victorious, the intoxicated country did not know yet.
Note the glaring lack of logic. The Chechen leadership has denied any involvement in the attacks. Zdanovich confirms that there are no Chechens among the perpetrators of the terrorist attack, but points out that the terrorists “probably” hid in Chechnya.
From this “probably” the “Chechen trail” of terrorists is deduced, on the basis of which, in turn, they are starting to bomb Chechnya. Aslan Maskhadov declares his readiness to negotiate, but he is not heard.
It is important for the FSB to draw Russia into the war as soon as possible, so that the presidential election in Russia takes place against the backdrop of a big war and that the new president, who comes to power, inherits the war along with the political consequences that it entails: the president’s reliance on law enforcement agencies. Only through war can the FSB finally seize power in the country.
Putin and Patrushev were not allowed to forget Ryazan’s history until the very presidential election. On the night of October 4, 1999, three GRU officers were missing in the Nadterechny district of Chechnya – Colonel Zuriko Ivanov, Major Viktor Pakhomov, Senior Lieutenant Alexei Galkin and GRU Officer, Chechen by nationality, Vesami Abdulaev.
The leader of the group, Zuriko Ivanov, graduated from the Ryazan School of Airborne Forces, got into special reconnaissance, served in the 15th Special Forces Brigade, still known in Afghanistan, then in the North Caucasus Military District.
He supervised the personal security of Doku Zavgayev, connected with Moscow. Shortly before the start of the second Chechen war, Ivanov was transferred to the central office in Moscow. His new position did not involve raids on hostile rear areas, but as soon as they began to prepare a ground operation in Chechnya, Ivanov was needed in the conflict zone.
On October 19, in Grozny, the head of the Chechen armed forces press center, Vakha Ibragimov, on behalf of the military command, told the assembled journalists that the GRU officers who had transferred to the Chechens “initiated contact with the Chechen military” and expressed a desire to cooperate with the Chechen authorities.
Ibragimov claimed that GRU officers and their agent were ready to provide information on the organizers of the bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk and Volgodonsk. The Russian Ministry of Defense called the statement by the Chechen side a provocation aimed at discrediting the domestic policy of the Russian leadership and the actions of federal forces in the North Caucasus. However, at the end of December 1999, the GRU officially recognized the death of the head of the Ivanov group: the headless corpse of the man and the blood-stained identity card of Colonel Zuriko Amiranovich Ivanov was handed over to the federal forces (the severed head of the officer was found later). On March 24, 2000, Zdanovich announced that the entire group of GRU employees had been executed by Chechens.
On January 6, 2000, The Independent, a London-based newspaper, published an article by correspondent Elena Vomak, “Russian agents blew up houses in Moscow”:
“The Independent received a videotape in which a Russian officer captured by the Chechens“ admits ”that the Russian special services bombed apartment buildings in Moscow, which sparked the current war in Chechnya and brought Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin.
On a film shot by a Turkish journalist (Sedat Aral) last month, before Grozny was finally cut off by Russian troops, a captured Russian calls himself an employee of the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) Alexei Galtin (Galkin). The prisoner who has grown a beard admits, and this is confirmed by his own documents, demonstrated by the Chechens, that he is “senior lieutenant of the special forces, special forces of the General Staff of the Russian Federation.”
The Ministry of Defense yesterday checked whether such a GRU officer actually exists. “Even if he exists, you understand what methods could be applied to him in captivity,” said one of the junior officers, who asked not to be named.
Colonel Yakov Firsov from the Ministry of Defense formally stated the following: “Chechen bandits feel that they are coming to an end, and they use any dirty tricks in the information war. This is a provocation. This is a lie. The Russian armed forces protect people. It is impossible to imagine that they are at war with their own people. ”
On videotape, Lieutenant Galtin (Galkin?) Says that he was captured on the Chechen-Dagestan border when he was carrying out an assignment to mine the terrain. “I did not take part in the bombings of houses in Moscow and Dagestan, but I have information about this. I know who is responsible for the bombings in Moscow (and Dagestan).
For the explosions in Volgodonsk and Moscow, the FSB (Federal Security Service) is responsible with the GRU. ” After that, he called other GRU officers. About three hundred people died when four high-rise buildings were blown up by terrorists in September.
These attacks made it possible for Mr. Putin, who had become Prime Minister a month before, to start a new war in Chechnya.
ISF news agency photographer Sedat Aral said he shot the video in a bunker in the city of Grozny, where he met with the head of the Chechen security service, Abu Movsayev. Mr. Movsaev said that Chechens can prove that they are not involved in the bombings of apartment buildings.
The Russian public supports the “anti-terrorism campaign” in Chechnya, which so sharply raised the popularity of its author, Mr. Putin, that Boris Yeltsin resigned ahead of schedule to give way to his successor. The war began to the obvious benefit of Mr. Putin. The former head of the Russian Security Service is now ready to realize his presidential ambitions. ”
The French newspaper Le Monde also wrote about the danger to Putin of revelations about the involvement of special services in the September bombings: “Having strengthened his popularity and won the State Duma elections as a result of the war unleashed against the Chechen people, Vladimir Putin understands that there are only two reasons. which could prevent him from becoming president in the March elections.
These are major military failures and loss of manpower in Chechnya, as well as recognition of the possible involvement of the Russian special services in the bombings of apartment buildings that claimed the lives of about 300 people in September last year and served as the official justification for the start of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya.
It is interesting that in the case of the bombings in Moscow, neither Lazovsky nor any of his people were interrogated, although it could be assumed that the same people were behind these attacks as those of the 1994-1996 attacks.
Only in the spring of 2000 did the prosecutor consent to the arrest of Lazovsky. At the same time, those who stood behind Lazovsky, and it is obvious that Lazovsky was primarily the Moscow FSB, decided to prevent the detention of Lazovsky.
According to operational information, immediately after the warrant for Lazovsky’s arrest was issued, he was killed: on April 28, 2000, on the threshold of the Assumption Cathedral in his village, he was shot from a Kalashnikov assault rifle with a silencer and an optical sight. Four bullets, one of which hit the throat, were deadly.
Shooting was carried out from bushes from a distance of about 150 meters. For some reason, a guarded jeep that has been relentlessly following Lazovsky recently was not around. The killer dropped his weapon and disappeared. Someone dragged a bloodied body to a nearby hospital and laid it on a bench. The local police attracted a doctor from the Odintsovo clinic to examine the corpse.
The documents for the examination of the murdered and the inspection of the scene were extremely sloppy and unprofessional, and this gave rise to the assertion that it was not Lazovsky who was killed, but his double.
On the evening of May 22, 2000, a small detachment of militants was ambushed by the GRU special forces in the area between the villages of Serzhen-Yurt and Shali. As a result of the fleeting battle, ten fighters were killed, the rest were scattered.
Among the dead was the 38-year-old field commander and head of the military counterintelligence of Chechnya, Abu Movsaev, who interrogated senior lieutenant Galkin and, probably, had additional information about the bombings.
Local residents said that in May Movsaev secretly came to spend the night several nights with relatives living in Shali. One of the members of the local administration informed the UFSB representative about this. He took no action. When the GRU special forces tried to capture the field commander, the FSB opposed it. A scandal erupted, the case was transferred to Moscow, where they decided to take Movsaev. However, he was not taken alive.
State Duma deputy Vladimir Volkov also believed that the September bombings were the work of special services: “For two consecutive times, the presidential election seemed to coincide with an aggravation of events in Chechnya. This time the Chechen campaign was preceded by terrorist attacks in Moscow, Buinaksk, Volgodonsk, Rostov …
But for some reason, an explosion in a residential building in Ryazan, now disguised as a teaching, broke out. As a military man, I know that not a single exercise is conducted with real explosive devices, and that the exercises must be done & 127; were & 127; know the local police and the FSB. Alas, everything was different in Ryazan, and the press has openly stated that all the “Chechen” terrorist attacks in Russian cities are the work of the special services that prepared the “little war” for Putin.
The search for an answer to these suspicions remains to be done, but today it’s clear that instead of a white horse, Putin slipped a red, overly sprinkled with folk blood. ”
In their own way, celebrating the anniversary of the bombings in Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk, FSB officers, known by “cover documents” as Major Ismailov and Captain Fedorov, carried out a terrorist attack in the underground passage of Pushkinskaya Square on August 8, 2000. 13 people died, more than a hundred were injured of varying severity. Near the site of the explosion, experts of the Moscow FSB found two more explosive devices and shot them from a hydraulic cannon.
The explosion at Pushkinskaya was a shot in the heart. “So far, unknown attackers have very accurately chosen a place for their action,” Vitaliy Portnikov wrote in the Kiev newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli on August 12.
– In order to understand what Pushkinskaya Square is for a resident of the Russian capital, you must, of course, be a Muscovite. Because Red Square, the Alexander Garden, the underground complex in Okhotny Ryad, the old Arbat are more likely places for tourist walks. Muscovites make appointments at Pushkinskaya (…). The old cinema “Russia”, turned into “Pushkinsky” and the ultramodern “Kodak-Kinomir”, the place of the youth “party”, the first in the USSR “McDonald’s” and the eastern snack bar system “Fir-Palki”, coffee houses and the office of Mobile Telesystems, ” Lenkom ”and the Doroninsky Moscow Art Theater, boutiques in the Gallery“ Actor ”and the most fashionable restaurant of Russian national cuisine“ Pushkin ”among the political elite – it was in it that Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov agreed with the Minister of Press Mikhail Lesin about the fate of his TV channel TV Center … Pushkinskaya is not just a city center , square or metro station. This is the habitat (…).
Blowing up a terrorist’s habitat is more important than putting a bomb under a residential building. Because the house may be neighboring, and the habitat is always yours. ”
Yuri Luzhkov hastily tried to blame this explosion on the Chechens: “100 percent is Chechnya.” Tired of constant accusations, the Chechens decided this time to curb the mayor. The head of the Chechen administration, Ahmad Kadyrov, expressed indignation at the fact that the Chechens were again unprovenly blamed for the explosion.
Kadyrov’s representative to the Russian government, former Foreign Minister in the administration of Dzhokhar Dudayev, Shamil Beno threatened a demonstration of Chechens in Moscow, and the chairman of the State Council of Chechnya, Malik Saydullaev, promised an impressive award for information about the true organizers of the explosion. Aslan Maskhadov also dissociated himself from the attack and expressed condolences to the Russians.
On August 5, 2000, twelve people – members of the special group of Andrei Alexandrovich Morev, who arrived at Petrovka 38 to instruct before the next operation – witnessed a conversation between Ismailov and Fedorov about work on Pushkinskaya Square.
Three days later, there really was a terrorist attack, and in the snapshots Morev identified two FSB officers.
Years, maybe even decades, will pass. Russia, of course, will be different. She will have a different political elite, a different political leadership. And if we are still alive, our children will ask us: why were you silent? When you were blown up in Moscow, Volgodonsk, Buinaksk, Ryazan – why were you silent?
Why did you act like experimental rabbits in a laboratory?
We were not silent. We screamed, shouted, wrote … Residents of house No. 14/16 on Novosyolov Street sued the FSB. A letter sent to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia said: “A monstrous experiment was put on us in which two hundred and forty innocent people were assigned the role of extras. “We all suffered not only severe mental trauma, but also irreparable harm to our health.” Ryazantsev supported the administration of the Ryazan region. However, things didn’t go further than words, the collective statement in the prosecutor’s office was lost.
On March 18, deputies of the Yabloko faction Sergey Ivanenko and Yuri Schekochikhin prepared a draft resolution of the State Duma on the parliamentary request and. about. Attorney General Vladimir Ustinov “On the fact of the discovery of explosive in Ryazan on September 22, 1999 and the circumstances of its investigation”.
Ivanenko and Schekochikhin suggested that the State Duma deputies get answers to the following questions: “At what stage is the criminal case upon the discovery of an explosive in Ryazan on September 22, 1999; whether an examination of the substance found was carried out; who and when gave the order to conduct the exercises, what were the goals and objectives of the exercises; what means and substances – explosive or imitating them – were used during the exercises; to check the publications of Novaya Gazeta No. 10 for 2000 that RDX was stored in a bag of sugar from the weapons and ammunition depot of one of the training units of the Airborne Forces. ”
The draft request also said that the FSB leadership changed its official position within two days from the day of the incident.
According to the first version, on September 22, 1999, a terrorist act was successfully prevented. According to the second – in Ryazan, exercises were conducted to test the combat readiness of law enforcement agencies. “A number of facts cited cast doubt on the official version of the events that took place in Ryazan,” the request said. Exercise related information is closed.
Materials of a criminal case initiated by the FSB Directorate in the Ryazan Region regarding the discovery of explosives are not available. The persons who launched the simulated explosive device, as well as those who issued the order to conduct the exercises, are not named.
“The statement by the FSB leadership that the substance found in Ryazan consisted of granulated sugar does not stand up to criticism.” In particular, the device used to analyze the substance found indicated the presence of RDX and was perfectly operational, and the detonator of the explosive device was not an imitation.
Alas, most members of the Duma voted a request not to produce. The pro-government faction Unity, the People’s Deputy group, part of the Regions of Russia faction and part of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) opposed the request. Yabloko, the Union of Right Forces (Union of Right Forces), the Communists (Communist Party of the Russian Federation) and the Agrarian and Industrial Group (APG) spoke in favor of the request. As a result, supporters of Shchekochikhin and Ivanenko gained 103 parliamentary votes (with the required 226). For some reason, members of the Russian parliament did not care about the September bombings.
The second attempt to put the question to the vote, undertaken on March 31, brought Shchekochikhin and Ivanenko closer to the goal, but did not succeed. When voting at a plenary meeting of the Duma, despite the support of the Communist Party, the APG and Yabloko, as well as the partial support of the Fatherland-All Russia factions and the Union of Right Forces, the draft request received 197 votes against 137, with one abstention. Not a single person voted from the Unity faction.
NTV and Ryazan
On March 16, 2000, Zdanovich indicated in one of his interviews that, according to information available from the FSB, journalist Nikolai Nikolaev, who is conducting the Independent Investigation program on NTV, intends to investigate Ryazan exercises in the studio in the coming days, even before the presidential election NTV.
The program was scheduled for March 24. It is not surprising that a few days before this came the news that had been awaited for many months.
On March 21, the Federal News Agency (FAN) reported on the results of the examination of sugar samples found in Ryazan on September 22, 1999. Information came to the FAN from the Ryazan region, from the head of the FSB Directorate for the Ryazan Region, Major General Sergeyev.
According to him, the examination found that the bags found contained sugar without any impurities in it. “As a result of studies of sugar samples, traces of trotyl, hexogen, nitroglycerin and other explosives were not found,” it was reported in an expert opinion.
In addition, according to Sergeyev, the examination confirmed that the explosive device found along with the bags of sugar was a fake.
“Therefore, we can conclude that this device was not explosive, since there was no explosive charge and explosive means in it,” the report said.
It gradually became clear that the FSB was trying to close the criminal case before the Nikolaev program and the presidential election.
The criminal case initiated on September 23, 1999 by the head of the investigative department of the Federal Security Service Directorate of the Russian Federation for Ryazan Region, Lt. Col. Maximov, was terminated on September 27 after Patrushev’s statement about the “exercises”.
However, on December 2, that is, after more than two months, the Prosecutor General’s Office considered that the criminal case was terminated prematurely and, having canceled the Ryazan FSB decision of September 27, resumed the investigation, making it clear that not everything was with the version of the “FSB exercises” it is well.
True, the “further investigation” was not entrusted to an independent investigation (this does not exist), but to the interested party – the FSB, the structure accused of planning the attack. Nevertheless, the case was not closed.
The Ryazan FSB repeatedly requested in the laboratory of the FSB in Moscow the results of a full examination of the substance in the sugar bags and the mechanical device found with them.
On March 15, 2000, the UFSB received a long-awaited response from Moscow (which the management so hoped for): “It was established that the substance in all samples (taken from three bags) is sucrose – the basis of sugar obtained from beet and cane raw materials.
In terms of chemical composition and appearance, the test substance corresponds to sugar in the form of a food product. No trace of explosives was found in the samples presented. The initiating device could not be used as a means of detonation, because there is no explosive charge in it.
Therefore, nothing really threatened the residents. ” So, there are no signs of “terrorism.”
“In my opinion, we got good enough reason to stop the case due to the educational nature of the events that took place on September 22, 1999 in the house on Novosyolov Street,” investigator Maximov, who initiated the case, said in an interview on March 21, 2000.
Battle of experts
Now it was up to disavow the results of the examination conducted by Tkachenko. This honor also fell on March 21 to Maximov’s share: “The analysis was carried out by the head of the ITO (engineering department) Yuri Vasilyevich Tkachenko. On his hands, as it later became clear, after a daily watch there were traces of plastite, which includes hexogen. It should be noted that such a “background” in the form of microparticles can be present on the skin for a long time – up to three months.
The purity of the analysis could be achieved only when working in disposable gloves. Alas, they are not included in the working kit of an explosion specialist, but there are no funds for their acquisition. We came to the conclusion that this is only why the police “diagnosed” the presence of explosives. ”
Perhaps this is exactly what Maximov wrote in the accompanying documentation to the Prosecutor General’s Office, explaining the need to close the case against the FSB under the article “terrorism”. We are not entitled to demand heroism from the investigator. Maximov, like all of us, has a family. And to go against the leadership of the FSB was impractical and risky.
However, it should be noted that Maximov’s opinion diverges from Tkachenko’s point of view, which cannot be suspected of being interested in this issue. Tkachenko’s integrity could not bring him anything but trouble.
The Ryazan branch of bomb experts, led by Tkachenko, was unique not only for Ryazan, but also for all nearby areas. It was staffed by 13 people, professional sappers, who had extensive experience, repeatedly took advanced training courses in Moscow on the basis of the Explosion Testing Scientific and Technical Center and passed special exams every two years.
Tkachenko claimed that the technology in his department was world-class. The gas analyzer used to analyze the substance found – a device that costs about 20 thousand dollars – was in perfect working order (it could not be otherwise, since the life of a sapper depends on the serviceability of the equipment). According to its technical characteristics, the gas analyzer has high reliability and accuracy, therefore, the results of the analysis, which showed the presence of RDX vapor in the contents of the bags, should not be in doubt.
Consequently, the composition of the simulated charge included military, not training, explosive. According to Tkachenko, the detonator, rendered harmless by bomb experts, was also manufactured at a professional level and was not a dummy.
Theoretically, an error could have occurred if the equipment was not properly maintained and if the gas analyzer “retained” traces of the previous study. Answering a question asked about this, Tkachenko said the following: “Only a narrow specialist conducts maintenance of the gas analyzer and is strictly on schedule: there are scheduled works, there are preventive checks, since there is a source of constant radiation in the device.”
The “traces” could not remain either because in any laboratory practice the determination of RDX vapor is a rather rare case. To recall cases when they had to determine the RDX with the device, Tkachenko and his employees could not.
On March 20, residents of the house along Novosyolov Street gathered to record the Independent Investigation program at NTV Studios. Representatives of the FSB arrived on television with them. The program aired on the 24th.
Alexander Zdanovich, First Deputy Head of the FSB Investigation Department Stanislav Voronov, Yuri Schekochikhin, Oleg Kalugin, Savostyanov, the head of the Ryazan Federal Security Service Service Sergeyev, FSB investigators and experts, independent experts, lawyers, human rights activists and psychologists took part in the public television investigation.
Speaking without masks and without weapons, the FSB officers obviously lost the battle with the population. Sugar examination, conducted almost half a year, looked anecdotal. “If you claim that there was sugar in the bags, then the criminal case on terrorism charges should be dismissed.
But the criminal case is still ongoing. It means that there was no sugar, ”exclaimed lawyer Pavel Astakhov, who did not know that the 21st case would be closed.
It was obvious that other bags, not those that were found in Ryazan, were sent for re-examination in Moscow. Nobody could just prove this evidence.
Rafael Gilmanov, an expert at the Transvzryvprom industry, who was present in the hall, confirmed that RDX is completely impossible to confuse with sugar. Even in appearance they are not similar. The expert called the implausible version of the FSB investigators that during the first examination the soiled bag of pyrotechnics “gave a trace”.
The allegations by the FSB representatives that the sappers, summoned to the scene of the incident, mistook the dummy for a real explosive device, were equally implausible.
FSB officers explained that General Sergeyev, who had reported the fuse and was now in the room, “was not a thin expert in the field of explosive devices” and was simply mistaken on September 22.
For some reason, General Sergeyev was not offended by the accusations of unprofessionalism, although on September 22 he made a public statement about the fuse, based on the conclusions of experts subordinate to him, whose professionalism was in no doubt.
It turned out that there were a lot of military men in the hall. They confidently stated that what had happened in Ryazan did not look even like the most “as close as possible” to military exercises. The preparation of military exercises is always accompanied by mandatory preparatory measures, in particular, in case of possible emergency, ambulance, medicines, dressings, warm clothing are being prepared.
Even the most important teachings, if they are related to actions among the civilian population, are necessarily coordinated with the local leadership and interested departments. In this case, nothing was prepared or agreed upon. So exercises are not conducted, one of the tenants of the house, a professional military man, categorically stated.
In general, the arguments of the FSB officers were so ridiculous that one of the tenants summed up the results in his own way: “We don’t need to hang noodles on our ears.” Here is a short excerpt from the television debate:
“People: The FSB Investigation Department has opened a criminal case. Did it bring a case against itself?
FSB: A criminal case has been opened upon discovery.
People: But if these were exercises, then by what fact?
FSB: You did not listen. The exercises were conducted to verify the interaction of various law enforcement agencies. At that moment, when a criminal case was opened, neither the Ryazan police nor the federal authorities knew that these were exercises …
People: So against whom is the case brought?
FSB: I say again – a criminal case was instituted upon discovery.
People: By what fact? In fact of the exercises in Ryazan?
FSB: It is useless to explain to a person who does not understand the criminal procedure legislation …
People: What was the security of citizens who spent all night on the street, what is security here for physical and mental health? And the second – you are outraged by the fact that telephone terrorists are calling and threatening explosions, but how do you differ from them?
FSB: What is the security of citizens? This is some kind of final effect when the explosions do not thunder …
People: I myself am a former military man. He conducted the exercises in 28 years, you know how much, and what solid people, generals tell about the exercises here, you know, your ears wither!
FSB: You, as a former military man, probably conducted military exercises. We have a special service, and in this service special forces and means are used on the basis of the law on operational-search activity …
(We intervene in a dispute between the people and the FSB and emphasize once again that the law “On the operational-search activity in the Russian Federation” only says that the exercises cannot be carried out to the detriment of the population.)
People: If someone recorded the course of the exercises, then where are these people?
FSB: If, of course, we increase our personnel every 10 times, then of course …
According to Zdanovich, the FSB is now investigating a criminal case on the fact of the September events in Ryazan. Absurdity, probably only possible in Russia: the FSB is investigating a criminal case on the fact of the exercises it conducted!
But the matter can only be instituted on the fact of alleged illegal actions. How then to relate to all previous statements by senior intelligence officers that there were no violations of the law during the exercises?
Residents of house No. 14 tried to file a lawsuit against the FSB with the Ryazan prosecutor’s office demanding compensation for moral damage. The residents were told that according to the procedural rules, they can bring a lawsuit only against a specific person who gave the order to conduct the exercises. Six times, Zdanovich and Sergeyev were asked the same question: who gave the order to conduct exercises in Ryazan?
Six times Zdanovich and Sergeyev evaded the answer, citing the interests of the investigation. (…) The lack of true information gave rise to the version that the security services really wanted to blow up a residential building in Ryazan to justify the offensive of the federal troops in Chechnya and to raise the morale of soldiers.
“I saw the contents of the bags, it doesn’t look like sugar at all,” concluded Alexei Kartofelnikov (the same driver who discovered the bags. – Ed.). “I’m sure that the bags were not sugar, but real RDX.”
Other residents of the house agree with him. So, I think, in the interests of the FSB itself, it would be to name the one who signed the order to conduct the exercises that undermined the trust and prestige of the Russian special services.
The practical result of the meeting in the studio was the intervention of the lawyer Astakhov in the old Ryazan class action lawsuit.
The injured party asked the Prosecutor General to explain the purpose of the operation to her, as well as to determine the amount and form of compensation for moral damage. This time the answer came suspiciously quickly: “FSB officers acted within their competence,” the Prosecutor General’s Office said.
And it’s clear why she was in a hurry. A press conference of Zdanovich was scheduled for March 24, at which the FSB leadership planned to “run into” the media, and the March 26, 2000 presidential election was scheduled.
After the shameful defeat of Zdanovich and his colleagues in the studio of Nikolaev, the FSB leadership decided not to participate in open debates with the population and not to go to NTV. Moreover, apparently, it was on these fateful days for the whole country that the FSB decided to begin the systematic destruction of NTV.
On March 26, the night after the presidential election, Boris Nemtsov openly declared in the Itogi results that Boris Nemtsov openly stated about the danger of the NTV closing down by the authorities in connection with the demonstration of Nikolaev’s Ryazan Sugar – Doctrines of the Special Services or a failed explosion?
“I do not know what will happen to NTV. After one of the authors, in my opinion, Nikolaev, his last name, outlined his version of the explosions in Moscow and other cities.
I think that a real threat looms over NTV … I consider it my duty to protect NTV if there are any attempts to close it. And I do not exclude that such an opportunity exists. At least with respect to a number of journalists, such attempts may not be from Putin’s side, but from the side of his entourage. ”
In an informal setting, FSB generals admitted that they had decided to “oust” NTV leaders of Gusinsky, Igor Malashenko and Kiselev from Russia.